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I
I. Introduction
On	April	30,	1956	the	great	orator	and	Senator	
Alben	Barkley	loudly	proclaimed,	“I’m	glad	to	sit	
in	the	back	row,	for	I	would	rather	be	a	servant	in	
the	house	of	the	Lord	than	sit	in	the	seats	of	the	
mighty.”	He	than	took	a	step	back	to	accept	the	
thunderous	applause	of	the	audience.	Suddenly,	
he	collapsed	to	the	ground.	His	wife	Jane	hurried	
to	the	stage;	but	it	was	too	late,	he	had	died	of	a	
heart	attack.	Since	his	death,	Barkley	has	largely	
been	forgotten	by	history.	Despite	this	historical	
amnesia,	Barkley	had	a	long	and	distinguished	
career	of	public	service	that	has	been	ignored.	He	
served	in	a	variety	of	elected	offices	and	played	
major	roles	in	the	political	debates	of	his	times.	
The	few	scholars	who	have	written	about	Barkley	
have	focused	mainly	on	his	early	career	and	his	
time	as	Senate	Majority	leader.	Few	Americans	
know	of	 his	 rousing	 keynote	 address	 in	 1948,	
his	“prop-stop”	campaign,	or	that	he	served	as	
Truman’s	vice-president	and	was	given	the	nick-
name	the	“VEEP.”		In	particular,	little	attention	
has	been	given	 to	Barkley’s	pivotal	 role	 in	 the	
1948	election.
While	Barkley	has	faded	from	view,	the	man	
he	propelled	 into	 the	presidency	has	gained	 in	
historical	stature.		Harry	Truman’s	upset	victory	
over	Thomas	Dewey	has	been	closely	examined	
by	historians,	e.g.,	Donaldson,	Truman Defeats 
Dewey;	Karabell,	The Last Campaign: How Harry 
Truman Won the 1948 Election;	and	McCullough,	
Truman.	 	 All	 are	 major	 works	 that	 focus	 on	
I	am	writing	to	convey	my	endorsement	of	John	Ghalien’s	
paper:	“Alben	W.	Barkley:	Harry	S.	Truman’s	Unexpected	
Political	Asset.”		John	wrote	this	paper,	his	senior	thesis,	
in	my	history	471	class.		Therefore,	I	am	quite	familiar	with	
the	research	and	the	resulting	paper.		It	was	very	exciting	
to	work	with	John	because	he	really	wanted	to	engage	in	
original	research.		So,	although	his	course	work	had	led	him	to	study	Ancient	
history,	the	excellent	source	material	housed	in	UK’s	Special	Collections	and	
Archives	beckoned	John	into	the	twentieth	century.		Because	he	is	deeply	
engaged	in	the	current	Presidential	election,	John	was	drawn	to	the	con-
troversies	surrounding	an	earlier	Presidential	election,	Truman’s	victory	in	
1948.		John	was	particularly	curious	about	the	historical	amnesia	that	has	
crept	up	around	this	election.		Alben	Barkley,	the	vice-presidential	nominee	
from	Kentucky,	has	largely	been	forgotten	in	the	national	narratives.		But,	as	
John	argues,	this	oversight	needs	to	be	corrected.		Truman’s	presidency	has	
experienced	a	renaissance,	thanks	in	part	to	a	popular	biography	by	David	
McCullough.		But,	what	about	Barkley?		As	John	demonstrates	in	his	paper,	
Barkley	helped	to	deliver	the	South	to	Truman	and	to	keep	the	South	an	
important	player	in	the	Democratic	Party.		When	we	consider	the	political	
landscape	of	the	decades	that	followed,	and	particularly	the	success	of	the	
Republican	Party	in	capturing	Southern	voters	on	cultural	issues,	Barkley’s	
unique	genius	seems	particularly	significant.
am	undergraduate	senior	majoring	in	both	English	
and	history.		The	work	that	I	present	here	was	done	
for	my	senior	thesis	for	my	honors	history	class.	
By	making	extensive	use	of	Senator	Alben	W.	Barkley’s	
archives	located	in	the	M.I.	King	Special	Collections	in	
the	library,	I	was	able	to	explore	the	role	Senator	Bar-
kley	had	on	the	Democratic	presidential	ticket	in	1948.	
One	of	the	greatest	assets	that	I	had	while	working	
on	the	project	was	my	professor	and	mentor	Dr.	Kathi	Kern	of	the	history	de-
partment.		Dr.	Kern	constantly	pushed	me	and	the	other	students	in	the	class	
to	produce	better	work	and	probe	deeper	into	our	research.		Her	efforts	were	
instrumental	in	making	my	thesis	the	work	that	it	is	today.		I	was	incredibly	
fortunate	to	have	her	as	a	professor	and	will	always	be	indebted	to	the	direc-
tion	and	encouragement	that	she	gave	me	while	working	on	this	project.
While	attending	UK,	I	was	active	in	a	number	of	student	organizations	
including:	Phi	Alpha	Theta,	College	Democrats,	and	UK	Kentuckians	for	the	
Commonwealth.
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Truman	and	his	reelection	efforts,	but	none	of	these	give	
Barkley	any	serious	attention.	The	picture	of	Truman	
holding	 the	Chicago Daily Tribune	with	 the	headline	
“Dewey	defeats	Truman”	and	the	memory	of	his	whistle	
stop	campaign	have	become	icons	of	American	political	
history.	While	Truman’s	role	in	the	campaign	has	been	
examined,	 Barkley’s	 contributions	 to	 the	 race	 have	
been	overlooked.	Barkley’s	popularity	—	both	 in	 the	
country	and	in	the	Democratic	Party	—	political	skills,	
and	 remarkable	 speaking	 ability	 bolstered	 Truman’s	
reelection	efforts	significantly	by	keeping	most	of	the	
South	 in	 the	Democratic	 column	 and	by	 picking	 up	
traditionally	Republican	states	in	the	Midwest.	
II. Early Career
Barkley	was	born	on	November	24,	1877,	 in	a	 small	
log	cabin	in	Graves	county	Kentucky.	While	attending	
Marvin	College,	a	small	Methodist	University,	Barkley	
joined	Marvin’s	Periclean	Debating	Society	where	he	
learned	 to	hone	his	 speaking	 and	debate	 skills.	 	His	
first	elected	position	was	county	attorney	in	1905,	but	it	
was	not	long	before	Barkley	ran	for	federal	office.	(Lib-
bey,	1979)		In	1912,	Barkley	was	elected	to	the	House	
of	Representatives	where	he	earned	a	reputation	as	a	
progressive	Democrat	by	working	closely	with	President	
Woodrow	Wilson	on	enacting	a	number	of	reforms.	This	
work	 led	 to	his	 political	maturity.	 Barkley	 “assumed	
Wilson’s	vision	of	America	as	a	nation	where	individual	
enterprise	and	competition	should	not	be	jeopardized	by	
monopoly	capitalism.”	(Libbey,	1979,	p.	67)		The	young	
Kentucky	Congressman	worked	with	the	Chief	Executive	
to	lower	tariffs	and	to	pass	both	the	Federal	Reserve	Act	
and	the	Clayton	Anti	Trust	Act.	Working	with	Wilson	
prepared	him	for	his	partnership	with	Roosevelt,	with	
whom	he	would	work	closely	on	several	pieces	of	New	
Deal	legislation.	
The	United	States	Senate	gained	a	new	member	in	
1926	after	Barkley	managed	to	win	a	close	primary	and	
general	election.	 (Hatfield,	1997,	p.	424)	 	During	 the	
campaign,	Barkley	had	been	forced	to	unite	the	different	
factions	of	the	Democratic	Party	in	Kentucky.		This	would	
prove	 to	be	 important	 in	his	Senate	career.	Historian	
James	K.	Libbey	writes,	“The	knack	he	possessed	 to	
conciliate	factions	and	ingratiate	himself	among	poten-
tial	opponents	would	serve	him	well	as	a	distinguished	
representative	from	Kentucky	to	the	United	States	Sen-
ate.”	(Libbey,	1979,	p.	48)		Barkley’s	time	in	the	Senate	
would	introduce	him	to	the	national	stage	and	earn	him	
a	reputation	as	a	strong	proponent	and	defender	of	the	
New	Deal	and	the	Democratic	Party.	
The	Senator’s	rise	in	importance	caused	him	to	be	
selected	to	give	the	Democratic	keynote	address	to	his	
party’s	convention	in	1932.	His	success	there	would	lead	
to	him	giving	the	keynote	address	again	in	1936,	1940,	
and	1948.	Barkley	reached	an	even	larger	audience	when	
his	party	selected	him	to	defend	the	New	Deal	against	
Henry	Fletcher,	the	chairman	of	the	Republican	Party,	in	a	
radio	address.	He	was	so	successful	that	his	party	selected	
him	to,	“confute	the	Republicans	in	1934	congressional	
elections,	when	he	launched	a	twenty-state	blitzkrieg	to	
defend	the	New	Deal	and	its	candidates.”	(Libbey,	1979,	
p.	67)		The	radio	address	that	Barkley	gave	led	to	higher	
name	recognition	with	the	general	public;	which	in	turn	
caused	FDR	to	use	him	in	his	legislative	efforts	more.	
President	Roosevelt	relied	on	Barkley	to	help	pass	
many	of	his	reforms	including:	the	AAA	(Agricultural	Ad-
justment	Act),	NIRA	(National	Industrial	Recovery	Act),	
and	FERA	(Federal	Emergency	Relief	Act).	(Libbey,	1979,	
p.	66)	On	May	27,	1935,	 the	Supreme	Court	declared	
several	pieces	of	New	Deal	legislation	unconstitutional,	
including	 the	NIRA.	Roosevelt	was	 infuriated	 by	 the	
Court’s	actions.	He	called	a	special	session	of	Congress	
and	 unveiled	 the	 second	 New	 Deal	 which	 included	
the	Banking	Act,	Social	Security	Act,	and	the	Wagner	
Relations	Act.	Roosevelt	would	not	forget	or	forgive	the	
Court’s	decision.	
The	Democrats	headed	to	their	convention	in	1936,	
with	FDR’s	second	New	Deal	in	mind.	Barkley	gave	the	
keynote	address	and	used	it	 to	defend	the	New	Deal,	
attack	 the	Hoover	 administration,	 and	 praise	 the	 ac-
complishments	of	the	president.	Barkley	also	attacked	
the	Supreme	Court.	He	asked	the	audience	“Is	the	court	
beyond	criticism?	May	it	be	regarded	as	too	sacred	to	
be	disagreed	with?”		 By	 striking	down	 the	NIRA,	 the	
Supreme	Court	had	infuriated	Barkley,	because	he	felt	
the	legislation	to	be	vital	for	improving	America’s	eco-
nomic	woes.		Barkley	did	not	comprehend,	“that	within	
his	keynote	address	lay	the	seeds	of	future	Democratic	
discord,	nationwide	controversy,	and	a	tragic	event	that,	
nonetheless,	 would	 elevate	 Barkley	 to	 new	 heights	
of	 leadership	and	 responsibility.”	 (Libbey,	199,	p.	71)	
Roosevelt	and	Barkley	collaborated	to	ensure	 that	 the	
Supreme	Court	would	not	strike	down	any	more	New	
Deal	legislation.
On	February	5,	1937	the	president	gave	Congress	
legislation	to	reorganize	the	Federal	Judiciary.	He	did	so	
without	giving	his	allies	in	Congress	any	warning.	This	
action	was	quickly	labeled	as	Roosevelt’s	“court-packing”	
plan.		The	bill	allowed	the	president	to	appoint	a	new	
federal	judge	for	every	member	of	the	bench	above	the	
age	of	seventy.	If	Congress	had	enacted	the	measure,	FDR	
would	have	had	the	power	to	appoint	six	new	justices.	
Americans	were	outraged	by	the	president’s	attempts	to	
reorganize	the	Supreme	Court	with	political	allies	who	
would	support	his	legislative	agenda.	The	conservative	
wing	 of	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 was	 equally	 outraged	
and	revolted	against	the	plan.	Senate	Majority	Leader	
Joseph	Robinson	and	Barkley	both	supported	the	bill,	
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and	attempted	to	convince	other	Democrats	of	its	merits.	
In	the	midst	of	the	legislative	battle	Robinson	died	of	a	
heart	attack	leaving	Barkley	acting	Majority	Leader.	With	
Robinson’s	death	any	hope	for	FDR’s	court	packing	plan	
ended.	(Hatfield,	1977,	p.	424)
III. Barkley as Majority Leader
Barkley’s	loyalty	to	Roosevelt	during	his	court	packing	
scheme	 led	 to	 the	 president	 backing	him	 for	 Senate	
Majority	Leader.	FDR	leaned	on	state	Democratic	lead-
ers	to	pressure	their	Senators	to	back	Barkley.		Also,	on	
July	15,	1937,	he	addressed	a	public	letter	to	“My	dear	
Alben”	signifying	his	support.	(Barkley	Papers,	Box	61,	
Folder	 1)	The	 conservative	wing	of	 the	party	 largely	
backed	Pat	Harrison	 of	Mississippi	who	had	 argued	
vehemently	against	 the	“court-packing”	plan.	(Krock,	
1937,	p.	16)		During	the	leadership	contest,	Barkley	had	
his	first	intimate	contact	with	Truman.		Initially,	Truman	
supported	Barkley,	but	changed	his	support	to	Harrison	
for	reasons	that	are	largely	unknown.		Before	switching,	
he	told	Barkley,	“The	pressure	on	me	is	so	great	that	I	am	
going	to	ask	you	to	relieve	me	of	my	promise.”	(Barkley,	
1954,	p.	155)		The	vote	was	close,	38	to	37	with	Barkley	
triumphant.	(Gullan,	1998,	pp.	117-8)		After	the	vote	was	
tallied,	Harrison	stepped	forward	and	moved	that	the	
vote	be	made	unanimous.
The	newly	elected	Majority	Leader	quickly	realized	
the	difficulties	of	his	position.	Early	into	his	term,	several	
J o h n  g h a e l i a na l B e n  W .  B a r k l e y :  h a r r y  s .  t r u m a n ’ s 
u n e x P e c t e d  P o l i t i c a l  a s s e t
Photo Courtesy of UK Public Policy Archives
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Barkley speaking in Louisville
Republican	senators	unexpectedly	introduced	an	anti-
lynching	bill.	(Davis,	1979)	This	angered	the	southern	
Democrats	who	quickly	threatened	to	filibuster.	Barkley	
was	surprised	by	the	Republican	bill	and	attempted	to	ad-
journ	the	Senate,	which	would	have	cleared	the	agenda	
for	the	day.	His	efforts	were	blocked	by	a	coalition	of	both	
Republicans	and	liberal	Democrats.	Republicans	finally	
agreed	to	withdraw	the	bill	when	Barkley	assured	them	
that	anti-lynching	legislation	would	take	top	priority	in	
the	next	session.	This	battle	over	civil	rights	legislation	
showed	a	major	rift	in	the	Democratic	majority.		“As	long	
as	the	party’s	agenda	remained	essentially	economic,	
its	 diverse	 elements	 held	 together.	When	 confronted	
with	racial	issues,	however,	the	complex	fabric	began	to	
unravel.”	(Ritchie,	1991,	p.	134)		The	tension	between	
the	two	factions	would	frustrate	Barkley	frequently	in	
his	role	as	Majority	Leader.	
Barkley	carried	out	his	word	and	supported	the	bill	
in	the	next	session,	but	despite	his	best	efforts	he	was	
unable	to	overcome	Southern	filibusters.	The	Kentucky	
Senator	supported	civil	rights	legislation	throughout	his	
tenure	as	Majority	Leader,	earning	him	the	admiration	of	
liberals.	He	was	always	willing	to	listen	to	conservative	
views	and	work	toward	compromise,	thus	also	earning	
the	respect	of	Southerners.	His	popularity	among	South-
erners	despite	his	stance	on	civil	rights	would	prove	to	
be	vital	later	in	his	career.	
Barkley	 became	 a	 member	 of	 the	 “Big	 Four”	
which	included	Vice	President	Henry	Wallace,	House	
Speaker	 Sam	 Rayburn,	 and	 House	 Majority	 Leader	
John	McCormack.	 (Hatfield,	 1997,	p.	 425)	 	The	 four	
met	regularly	with	FDR	to	discuss	the	administration’s	
legislative	 priorities	 and	 strategies.	 Barkley	 generally	
led	the	president’s	efforts,	but	 in	1944	he	broke	with	
him	over	a	controversial	tax	bill.	The	president	vetoed	
a	two	billion	dollar	tax	increase	calling	it	relief	“not	for	
the	needy,	but	for	the	greedy.”	Barkley	was	shocked	by	
the	president’s	actions.	The	tax	bill	had	been	the	result	
of	hard	work	and	compromise	and	the	Majority	Leader	
felt	it	was	the	best	he	could	do.	The	president	knew	his	
feelings,	but	chose	to	ignore	them.
The	Majority	Leader’s	surprise	quickly	gave	way	to	
anger;	he	discussed	the	matter	with	his	wife	and	both	
came	to	the	conclusion	that	he	would	have	to	break	with	
the	president.	Barkley	stayed	up	late	into	the	night	pacing	
the	floor	of	his	room	wondering	how	he	would	respond.	
(Barkley,	1954,	p.	175)		The	next	day	he	entered	the	Sen-
ate	chamber	determined	to	give	a	speech	responding	to	
the	president’s	veto.	The	Kentuckian	spoke	with	anger	
that	was	rare	for	him.	He	saved	special	vehemence	for	
the	President’s	statement	that	the	tax	bill	was	for	the	
greedy,	declaring	in	a	speech	in	Washington	on	February	
22,	1944,	“That	statement	is	a	calculated	and	deliberate	
assault	upon	the	legislative	integrity	of	every	member	
of	 the	Congress	of	 the	United	States.”	 	He	ended	his	
speech	by	resigning	as	Majority	Leader	to	the	shock	of	
his	colleagues.	His	speech	was	highly	regarded	by	his	
colleagues	who	 showered	 it	with	applause.	The	next	
day	he	was	unanimously	reelected	to	his	position,	and	
Congress	overrode	the	president’s	veto.	
The	controversy	over	the	tax	bill	seriously	strained	
Barkley’s	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship,	but	because	of	
Barkley’s	popularity	the	president	moved	to	make	pub-
lic	amends	with	him.	He	sent	the	Kentuckian	another	
“Dear	Alben”	letter	on	February	23,	1944.	The	president	
declared,	“Certainly,	your	differing	with	me	does	not	af-
fect	my	confidence	in	your	leadership	nor	in	any	degree	
lessen	my	 respect	 and	 affection	 for	 you	personally.”	
(Barkley	papers,	Box	16,	Folder	10)		Barkley	accepted	
the	president’s	gesture.		He	graciously	replied	the	next	
day,	“If	we	cannot	trust	one	another	in	this	tragic	period	
of	our	nation	and	of	the	world,	how	can	the	people	trust	
us?”	(Barkley	Papers,	Box	16,	Folder	10)		Despite	the	
exchange	of	letters	between	the	two,	their	partnership	
would	never	be	the	same.		
IV. Barkley and Truman
During	the	convention	of	1944,	FDR	set	out	to	find	a	
new	vice	president.	The	majority	of	 the	delegates	 fa-
vored	Barkley	but,	“Roosevelt	would	not	tolerate	one	
who	had	so	recently	rebelled	against	him.”	(Hatfield,	
1997,	 p.	 425)	 	 Roosevelt	 ultimately	 decided	 to	 pick	
Truman	 over	 Barkley.	 Barkley	 later	 recalled	 that	 his	
Alben Barkley. Year 1949
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relationship	 with	 Roosevelt	 improved	 after	 he	 cam-
paigned	 vigorously	 for	 the	Roosevelt-Truman	 ticket.	
(Barkley,	 1954,	 p.191)	 	 When	 FDR	 died	 in	 1945	 it	
was	Truman	who	became	president	and	not	Barkley.	
Barkley	continued	 to	serve	as	Majority	Leader	under	
President	 Truman.	 The	 two	 men	 managed	 to	 work	
reasonably	well	together,	but	their	relationship	was	not	
as	smooth	as	Barkley’s	and	Roosevelt’s	had	been.	This	
unevenness	was	 largely	 due	 to	Truman’s	 difficulties	
coordinating	his	office	with	the	legislative	branch.	The	
Senator	often	felt	that	Truman	would	launch	a	major	
legislative	effort	without	consulting	the	members	of	his	
party	beforehand.	Still	Barkley	continued	to	work	with	
Truman	on	several	pieces	of	 legislation	 including	the	
European	Recovery	Program.	Dean	Acheson,	Truman’s	
secretary	of	state,	described	Barkley	as	the	president’s	
“field	commander.”	(Acheson,	1961,	p.	140)	
Truman	had	numerous	 challenges	 awaiting	 him	
after	 he	 took	 the	 oval	 office.	With	 the	 end	of	World	
War	II,	America	had	entered	a	new	era	in	which	a	Cold	
War	with	the	Soviet	Union	was	looming;	and	America’s	
economy	needed	to	be	converted	from	wartime	to	peace-
time.	Americans	turned	to	the	new	president	to	guide	
them	through	these	challenges,	but	quickly	found	his	
leadership	lacking.	The	new	president,	“suffered	from	
inexperience,	a	poor	image,	and	bad	advice.”	(Donald-
son,	1999,	p.	7)		Truman’s	difficulties	can	be	seen	with	
the	conversion	of	America’s	economy.	In	order	to	hold	
J o h n  g h a e l i a na l B e n  W .  B a r k l e y :  h a r r y  s .  t r u m a n ’ s 
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Leaving Blair House for the inauguration with President Truman, their wives, and the Trumans’ daughter 
Margaret. Year 1948. Photo by John Adams
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tions.	Liberals,	conservatives,	farmers,	unions,	African	
Americans	all	had	complaints,	and	Truman,	unlike	his	
predecessor,	was	unable	to	walk	the	tight	balancing	act	
required	to	satisfy	one	element	of	the	coalition	without	
offending	 another.	 (Donaldson,	 1999,	 pp.	 6-7)	 	 This	
break	 up	 had	 caused	 the	Democrats	 historic	 losses,	
which	caused	 the	Democrats	 to	 turn	 their	 frustration	
on	Truman.
Barkley	became	minority	leader	after	the	Democrats	
lost	their	majority.		His	first	major	decision	as	minority	
leader	would	have	 implications	 that	would	affect	 the	
1948	presidential	election.	The	matter	 involved	Sena-
tor	Theodore	Bilbo	of	Mississippi,	a	segregationist	who	
had	been	accused	of	fraud.	Barkley	worked	out	a	com-
promise	with	the	new	Majority	Leader	Robert	Taft	that	
allowed	him	to	be	seated.	Bilbo	died	shortly	after	this,	
but	Barkley’s	actions	confirmed	in	“the	mind	of	many	
southerners	that	Barkley	was	a	man	whose	word	they	
down	inflation,	Truman	retained	wage	and	price	controls	
that	had	been	created	during	the	war.	Organized	labor	
was	infuriated	by	the	wage	freeze	and	labor	strikes	oc-
curred	all	across	the	country.	Union	strikes	created	even	
more	economic	difficulty.		Consumers	who	believed	that	
economic	prosperity	had	 returned	were	 frustrated	by	
Truman	who	was,	“telling	them	that	the	products	they	
had	been	denied	for	so	long	would	remain	unobtainable	
for	a	just	a	while	longer.”	(Donaldson,	1999,	p.	14)		Re-
publicans	were	quick	to	use	this	dissatisfaction	to	their	
electoral	advantage.
Americans	vented	their	frustrations	with	the	Truman	
administration	in	1946	by	giving	Republicans	control	of	
both	houses	of	Congress	for	the	first	time	since	1930.	
Republicans	used	messages	such	as,	“Had	enough?”	and,	
“To	err	is	Truman”	to	recapture	Congress.	The	New	Deal	
coalition	that	Roosevelt	had	worked	so	hard	to	foster	and	
maintain	had	seemingly	fallen	apart	in	the	1946	elec-
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President Truman, Senator Alben Barkley, Governor Simeon Willis of Kentucky. Year 1946
could	trust.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	118)		The	Kentuckian	was	
unique	because	he	was	popular	with	all	segments	of	the	
Democratic	Party.
Many	of	 the	 actions	 of	 the	Republican	Congress	
infuriated	Barkley.	He	was	especially	angered	by	the	pas-
sage	of	the	Taft-Hartley	Act,	which	allowed	government	
injunctions	in	labor	disputes	to	weaken	organized	labor’s	
strength.	The	Minority	Leader	encouraged	Truman	to	
veto	the	bill	and	was	dismayed	when	Congress	overrode	
the	veto.	After	the	passage	of	Taft-Hartley,	Barkley	could	
be	seen	wearing	a	tie	that	stated,	“Repeal	Taft-Hartley	
Act.”	(Libbey,	1979,	p.	93)		The	law	was	particularly	
frustrating	because	it	seemed,	“Americans	had	tired	of	
reformist	crusades,	and	the	slide	toward	conservatism	
allowed	Republicans	to	throw	damaging	punches	at	New	
Deal	ideas.”	(Libbey,	1979,	p.	93)		To	a	Senator	from	
Kentucky	who	had	dedicated	his	life	to	many	different	
reforms,	this	trend	was	particularly	disheartening.		
Besides	 facing	 difficulties	 in	 the	 public	 arena,	
Barkley	also	had	personal	problems	to	deal	with	at	the	
same	time,	the	most	serious	of	which	was	the	deterio-
rating	health	of	his	wife	Dorothy.	The	expensive	costs	
of	medical	treatment	and	nursing	care	had	forced	the	
couple	to	sell	their	Washington	home	and	move	into	an	
apartment.		Barkley	began	accepting	speaking	engage-
ments	all	across	the	country,	“to	provide	the	treatment	
and	the	special	nursing	care	that	she	needed.”	(Barkley,	
1954,	p.	71)		On	March	10,	1947,	Dorothy	passed	away.	
(Louisville	Courier Journal.	March	13,	1947)		Her	death	
was	a	crushing	blow	to	Barkley,	but	did	not	stop	him	
from	continuing	to	serve	as	Minority	Leader.	
V. Barkley and the 1948 Election
With	the	Republicans	firmly	in	control	of	Congress	many	
people	 were	 predicting	 that	 the	 Republicans	 would	
capture	 the	White	House	 in	 1948.	 	 Barkley	was	not	
optimistic	going	into	the	election.	In	a	May	19th	letter	
to	his	friend	Claude	Bowers,	Barkley	expressed	his	feel-
ings	about	the	circumstances:	“I	deplore	the	situation	
in	which	our	party	has	been	placed	with	regard	to	the	
coming	contest.”	 (Barkley	Papers,	Box	65,	Folder	11)	
He	disagreed	with	Bowers’	suggestion	that	he	challenge	
Truman	for	the	nomination	writing	that,	“In	many	ways,	
he	has	not	done	a	bad	job	of	administering	the	govern-
ment.”	(ibid.)		Barkley	believed	that	most	of	the	mistakes	
Truman	had	made	had	been	of	a	political	nature.	He	
agreed	with	the	president	on	most	issues,	but	felt	that	
his	 poor	 communications	with	Congress	had	 created	
unnecessary	difficulties.	
	He	offered	 the	 example	 of	 civil	 rights.	 	Barkley	
had	always	favored	equal	rights	for	all	Americans;	in	
Congress	he	had	consistently	voted	against	the	poll	tax	
and	in	favor	of	anti-lynching	laws,	but	he	believed	that	
compromise	was	necessary.	Truman,	he	 argued,	 had	
tried	to	do	too	much	at	one	time.		In	the	same	letter	
to	Bowers,	he	stated	that	the	administration,	“threw	a	
whole	basket	full	of	matters	in	the	lap	of	Congress	at	one	
swing	and	the	result	has	been	that	it	has	injured	him…	in	
the	South	and	it	is	doubtful	whether	it	has	helped	much	
in	the	North.”	(ibid.)		Barkley	believed	that	the	situation	
had	calmed	somewhat,	but	that	it	was	still	tenuous.	
Barkley’s	 frustrations	with	Truman	did	not	make	
him	look	upon	the	other	political	party	favorably.	The	
Senator	believed	that	the	Republicans	had	nothing	to	run	
on	in	1948.	He	bluntly	wrote	to	Bowers,	“I	realize	that	
after	16	years	the	people	make	up	their	minds	to	change	
party	control	of	their	government,	but	the	Republicans	
really	have	nothing	constructive	to	offer.”	(ibid.)		Barkley	
further	argued	that	the	New	Deal	coalition	of	Roosevelt	
had	accomplished	a	great	deal	in	the	sixteen	years	that	
it	had	controlled	the	government.	Barkley	thought	that	
Senator	Taft	was	the	best	of	all	the	Republican	candidates	
calling	him,	“honest	and	courageous.”	(ibid.)		He	still	
thought	that	the	Democrats	could	beat	him	and	any	other	
Republican	candidate,	despite	the	mood	of	the	party.
Many	 Democrats	 were	 convinced	 that	 the	 1948	
election	was	going	 to	be	a	disaster	 for	 the	party,	un-
less	 they	found	somebody	to	replace	Truman.	People	
began	 to	 approach	Barkley	 to	 convince	him	 to	 chal-
lenge	Truman	 for	 the	 nomination.	 They	 feared	 that,	
not	only	would	Truman	cost	them	the	election,	but	that	
his	civil	rights	platform	would	split	the	party	irrevers-
ibly.	Barkley	refused	to	accept	any	of	these	overtures.	
With	the	party’s	national	convention	approaching,	the	
solicitations	became	more	fervent.	Earle	Clements,	the	
J o h n  g h a e l i a na l B e n  W .  B a r k l e y :  h a r r y  s .  t r u m a n ’ s 
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Democratic National Convention – Ed Halsey presents gavel to Senator 
Alben Barkley (Left to Right) Ken Romney, Ed Halsey, Pat Haltigin, Alben 
Barkley, Clarence Cannon, Joe Sennot. Year 1932
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Governor	of	Kentucky	at	the	time	and	the	leader	of	the	
Kentucky	Democratic	Party,	was	one	of	the	people	who	
approached	Barkley	about	running	for	president.	Barkley	
refused	to	go	along.	Writing	to	a	friend	about	the	matter,	
Clements	explained,	“The	entire	Kentucky	delegation	did	
everything	within	its	power	to	bring	this	about,	but	at	the	
expressed	wish	of	the	Senator	himself,	it	was	necessary	
that	we	limit	our	sight	to	the	Vice	Presidential	nomina-
tion.”	(Clements	Papers,	Box	228,	Folder	2)		Despite	all	
the	 attempts	 to	make	 it	 otherwise,	Barkley	 remained	
loyal	to	Truman.
J.	Howard	McGrath,	the	national	chairman	of	the	
Democratic	Party,	selected	Barkley	to	give	the	keynote	
address	at	the	convention.	Historian	Neal	E.	Claussen	
argues	that	Barkley	was	selected	again	for	several	rea-
sons,	but	 the	most	 important	one	 stemmed	 from	his	
popularity	in	the	South.	Claussen	explains	that	Southern	
frustration	over	civil	rights	had	increased	the	likelihood	
of	Southern	democrats	 leaving	 the	party,	causing	 the	
national	committee	 to	name	“two	Southerners	 to	 the	
top	convention	offices,	Barkley	as	temporary	chairman	
and	Sam	Rayburn	as	permanent	chairman.”	(Claussen,	
1979,	p.	82)		Barkley	went	to	the	convention	determined	
to	make	the	most	of	 the	opportunity	 to	give	one	 last	
keynote	address.	
The	Democratic	convention	began	on	July	10,	1948.	
The	 delegates	 who	 attended	 the	 convention	 were	 a	
forlorn	group,	convinced	that	the	party	had	no	chance	
of	victory	in	November.	The	New York Times noted,	“It	
is	a	simple	statement	of	fact,	not	an	editorial	judgment,	
to	report	that	the	majority	of	delegates	assembled	here	
have	no	enthusiasm	whatever	over	naming	him	[Tru-
man]	 as	 their	 standard-bearer	 for	 1948	 against	Gov.	
Thomas	 E.	 Dewey.”	 (Lawrence,	 1948a,	 p.	 E7)	 	 The	
mood	of	the	Democratic	delegates	was	in	stark	contrast	
with	the	Republican	convention	that	had	been	held	in	
Philadelphia	two	weeks	before.	According	to	the	article,	
“The	Republicans	were	 certain	 of	 victory,	 no	matter	
whom	they	nominated.”	(ibid.)		The	mood	of	his	party’s	
convention	did	not	go	unnoticed	by	Barkley	who	later	
remarked,	“When	I	got	over	there	on	Saturday	before	
the	convention,	you	could	cut	gloom	with	a	corn	knife.”	
(Shalett,	1953)		Barkley	entered	Philadelphia	determined	
to	rouse	his	party	out	of	the	stupor	into	which	they	had	
fallen.
On	 July,	 12	 Barkley	 delivered	 his	 address.	 The	
speech	was	a	 call	 to	 arms	 to	all	 the	Democrats	who	
heard	 it.	Barkley	attacked	the	record	of	 the	80th	Con-
gress	and	tied	the	Democrats	to	the	New	Deal	and	FDR.	
Claussen	writes,	 “Barkley	 knew	 that	Democrats	 had	
little	to	cheer	about	since	1946	and	realized	defeatism	
could	be	 surmounted	by	 arousing	 a	 sense	 of	 pride.”	
(Claussen,	1979,	p.	85)		By	using	the	accomplishments	
of	the	New	Deal,	Barkley	turned	the	focus	to	the	previous	
and	more	popular	president	Roosevelt.	In	his	address,	
the	Kentuckian	proudly	declared,	“In	the	first	place,	it	
was	 recovery.	 The	new	administration	breathed	 into	
the	nostrils	of	every	enterprise,	large	or	small,	a	breath	
of	 new	 life	 and	new	hope	 and	determination.”	 	The	
Senator	made	the	argument	that	Democrats	who	had	
created	the	New	Deal	had	helped	people	in	their	time	
of	need;	while	the	Republican	Party	had	fought	it	“as	
if	it	were	some	blight	or	plague	that	had	poisoned	the	
lives	and	consumed	the	liberties	of	the	people	and	kept	
them	chained	and	helpless.”
The	New	Deal	had	helped	all	segments	of	society	
Barkley	argued.	Farmers	benefited	from	programs	that	
had	brought	electricity	to	a	large	swath	of	rural	areas	for	
the	first	time,	price	controls	had	given	them	a	stable	mar-
ket,	and	soil	conservation	had	led	to	better	crops.		The	
elderly	found	financial	protection	with	Social	Security.	
Laborers	had	profited	under	a	federal	government	that	
supported	a	worker’s	right	to	organize,	demand	better	
working	conditions,	and	receive	a	minimum	wage.		The	
upper	classes	were	not	left	out	of	Barkley’s	speech.	He	
mentioned	several	programs	such	as	the	Securities	and	
Exchange	Commission,	 the	 Export-Import	 Bank,	 the	
Reciprocal	 Trade	Agreement,	 and	 the	Reconstruction	
Finance	Corporation.	 	Barkley	argued	 that	 these	pro-
grams	had	created	higher	employment	levels,	increased	
production,	and	prosperity	for	all.	
Barkley	attacked	the	Republicans	in	his	Keynote	ad-
dress	for	doing	nothing	to	help	people	during	the	Great	
Oliver J. Carter, Chairman Democratic State Central Committee of Califor-
nia; Alben W. Barkley, Vice President; E. George Luckey, Vice Chairman, 
Democratic State Central  Committee. Year 1949
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Depression	and	for	having	no	accomplishments	since	
recapturing	Congress.	Barkley	challenged	the	convention	
audience:	“Let	us	ask,	and	let	the	American	people	ask,	
those	who	spray	this	forest	of	superb	accomplishment	
with	the	froth	of	their	vindictive	lips,	which	tree	will	
they	cut	down	with	their	mighty	ax	or	puny	hatchet?”	
With	 this	 question	Barkley	 implied	 that	Republicans	
would	 dismantle	 the	New	Deal	 if	 they	 regained	 the	
White	House.	He	used	his	famous	sense	of	humor	to	
dismiss	Republican	promises	 to	eradicate	bearcats	by	
defining	one,	“as	a	Democrat	who	holds	some	office	that	
a	Republican	wants.”		The	Republicans’	record,	Barkley	
declared,	“is	one	of	things	promised	and	not	consum-
mated.”		Barkley	historian	James	K.	Libbey	argues	that	
Barkley’s	attacks	on	Republicans	for	inaction	established	
the	 Eightieth	Congress’	 “do-nothing”	 reputation	 that	
both	he	and	Truman	would	use	during	the	campaign.	
(Libbey,	1979,	p.	95)		Barkley	avoided	the	civil	rights	
issues	and	ended	the	speech	with	a	prayer.
The	crowd’s	spirit	had	been	buoyed	by	 the	Ken-
tuckians’	magnificent	 oratory.	Cheering	 had	 erupted	
throughout	 the	speech.	A	 journalist	who	covered	 the	
event	observed	that	Barkley	had	been	encouraged	before	
the	speech	to	give	a	short	address	“but	the	interpola-
tions	and	the	applause	his	remarks	brought	made	it	at	
least	68	minutes.”	(Lawrence,	1948b,	p.1)		The	cheering	
after	Barkley	finished	continued	for	half	an	hour	as	the	
orchestra	 played	 “My	Old	Kentucky	Home.”	 (Davis,	
1979,	p.	359)		Barkley’s	speech	lifted	the	gloom	from	
the	convention	hall	in	Philadelphia.	Clark	N.	Clifford,	
Truman’s	political	strategist,	wrote	to	Barkley	a	few	days	
later,	on	July	19,	“Your	keynote	address	was	the	turning	
point	in	the	convention.	It	gave	life	to	the	meeting	and	
hope	and	inspiration	to	the	delegates.	It	was	a	masterful	
job	and	all	good	Democrats	are	grateful	to	you.”	(Bark-
ley	Papers,	Box	27,	Folder	13)		Talk	began	again	about	
replacing	Truman	on	the	ticket,	but	Barkley	ended	it,	
saying	to	anyone	who	proposed	it	to	him,	“If	anybody	
puts	my	name	in	nomination	before	this	convention	for	
President	of	the	United	States,	I	will	arise	and	renounce	
it,	because	I	will	not	come	here	as	a	candidate.”	(Sha-
lett,	1953)		Barkley	was	much	more	open	to	the	idea	of	
running	with	Truman.	
The	delegates	 at	 the	 convention	wanted	Barkley	
to	be	selected	as	the	president’s	running	mate.	Truman	
was	not	thrilled	by	the	prospect.		His	first	pick	had	been	
Supreme	Court	Justice	William	O.	Douglas.	The	president	
wanted	Douglas	because	“the	liberal	Democrats	were	
about	to	bolt	the	party	with	Henry	Wallace,	the	naming	
of	such	a	popular	liberal	as	Douglas	could	be	conceived	
as	an	act	of	party	unification.”	(Claussen,	1979,	p.	898)	
Henry	Wallace	had	served	as	Roosevelt’s	third	vice	presi-
dent	and	served	as	Truman’s	Secretary	of	Commerce.		He	
and	many	other	liberals	in	the	Democratic	Party	thought	
the	administration	was	too	conservative	on	issues	such	
as	civil	rights	and	too	hawkish	in	foreign	policy.		These	
disenfranchised	progressives	were	encouraging	Wallace	
to	run	for	president	with	the	Progressive	Party.	Truman	
hoped	to	counteract	them	by	nominating	Douglas	as	his	
vice	president.		During	the	convention,	Clifford	was	in	
contact	with	Douglas	encouraging	him	to	run,	but	he	
was	unsuccessful.		Douglas	decided	to	remain	on	the	
Supreme	Court.	(Heiss,	1971).	
After	his	keynote	address,	the	delegates	at	the	con-
vention	were	firmly	behind	Barkley	for	vice	president.		In	
support	of	their	“Mr.	Democrat”	the	delegates	launched	
J o h n  g h a e l i a na l B e n  W .  B a r k l e y :  h a r r y  s .  t r u m a n ’ s 
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Vice President Alben W. Barkley speaking. Year 1949
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a	28	minute	demonstration	to	pressure	Truman	to	select	
him.	(Lawrence,	1948b,	p.	1)		The	President	did	not	want	
Barkley	because	he	was	seventy	years	old	and	because	
he	brought	no	regional	balance	to	the	ticket.		Truman’s	
lack	 of	 enthusiasm	 frustrated	Barkley	who	 remarked	
to	several	reporters	in	Philadelphia,	“I	never	cared	for	
cold	biscuits.”	(Barkley,	1954,	p.	198)		Truman’s	lack	
of	support	for	Barkley	did	not	matter	after	the	speech	
because,	“The	convention	made	up	the	President’s	mind	
for	him.”	(ibid.)		McGrath	phoned	the	Chief	Executive	to	
inform	him	that	the	delegates	were	demanding	Barkley.	
Truman	gave	in	to	the	pressure	and	telephoned	Barkley	
and	asked	him	to	be	the	nominee.	Barkley	replied,	“Well,	
I	suppose	I	will	accept	it	if	I’m	nominated,	but	I’m	not	
going	to	lift	a	finger	to	get	the	nomination.”	(Shalett,	
1953)		The	delegates	would	do	all	 the	work	for	their	
beloved	Senator.
On	July	13,	William	Wyatt	of	the	Kentucky	delega-
tion	nominated	the	minority	leader.		In	his	speech	he	
described	Barkley	as	man	“to	be	counted	on.”		Wyatt	
declared,	“He	has	the	heart	for	the	struggle,	the	courage	
for	the	fight,	and	all	that	it	takes	to	carry	our	banner	
to	victory	on	November	2.”		Barkley	was	selected	by	
acclamation.	 (Lawrence,	 1948c)	 	After	 his	 selection,	
Barkley	gave	a	brief	speech	in	which	he	promised	to	
follow	Truman’s	leadership,	the	party’s	platform,	and	
to	work	toward	victory.	(ibid.)		Truman	then	gave	his	
acceptance	speech	in	which	he	promised	victory	and	
attacked	the	Republicans	declaring	“the	country	cannot	
afford	another	Republican	Congress.”	(ibid.)		During	his	
acceptance	speech	the	president	announced	he	was	call-
ing	a	special	session	of	Congress	to	give	the	Republicans	
the	opportunity	to	enact	their	convention’s	platform	into	
law.	(ibid.)		Truman	hoped	the	Republicans	would	fail	
to	do	so,	cementing	public	opinion	against	them.		The	
Democrats	left	the	convention	hall	with	a	ticket,	but	few	
expected	the	pair	to	be	victorious	in	November.	
The	Democratic	National	Convention	 ended	dra-
matically.		The	adoption	of	a	strong	civil	rights	plank	
over	their	objections	had	infuriated	much	of	the	Southern	
delegation.		New York Times	reporter	W.	H.	Lawrence	
noted,	“For	the	first	time	in	many	years	the	Presidential	
nominee’s	selection	was	not	made	unanimous.”	(ibid.)	
Half	 of	Alabama’s	 delegation	 and	 all	 of	Mississippi’s	
walked	 out.	 Hubert	 Humphrey	 had	 pushed	 through	
the	plank	and	had	led	the	effort	that	ended	Southern	
attempts	 to	 add	 a	 states’	 rights	 plank.	 Shortly	 after	
the	convention,	the	Democratic	Party	would	have	two	
schisms.	The	far	left	wing	of	the	party	led	by	Wallace	
formed	 the	Progressive	Party.	 (Hagerty,	 1948,	 p.	 36)	
The	disillusioned	Southerners	formed	the	States	Rights	
Party	and	nominated	Strom	Thurmond,	the	Governor	
of	South	Carolina,	for	president.	(Popham,	1948,	p.	1)	
Barkley	was	needed	to	limit	the	electoral	damage	of	the	
southern	bolt.	
The	special	session	of	Congress	worked	exactly	the	
way	Truman	hoped	it	would.		The	Republicans	failed	to	
enact	any	major	initiative	and	Barkley	led	the	Democrats’	
efforts	during	the	session.	(ibid.)		On	the	last	day	of	the	
session,	the	Minority	Leader	attempted	to	pass	a	broad	
anti-inflation	bill.		Reporter	William	White	noted,	“The	
last	main	stand	of	the	Democrats	was	made	deliberately	
to	highlight	a	single	issue,	that	of	high	prices.”	(ibid.)	
The	 Republicans	 defeated	 Barkley’s	 bill	 and	 passed	
their	own	much	less	encompassing	version.	(ibid.)		The	
defeat	frustrated	Barkley	so	much	that	he	shouted,	“The	
theme	song	of	the	Republican	Party	between	now	and	
November	should	be	‘I’ve	got	plenty	of	nothing’.”	(ibid.)	
Because	Republicans	failed	to	pass	any	major	piece	leg-
islation,	“Dewey	was	denied	the	ammunition	he	could	
have	used	to	wage	an	aggressively	unified	campaign.”	
(Gullan,	1998,	p.	110)		Barkley’s	efforts	to	pass	major	
legislation	while	the	Republicans	blocked	it	created	the	
image	Truman	hoped	it	would:	Democrats	lead	and	cre-
ate	prosperity	while	Republicans	only	make	promises,	
but	in	actuality	“do-nothing.”	The	Republicans	had	given	
the	Democrats	the	major	theme	of	their	campaign.	
During	the	special	session,	Barkley	and	Truman	met	
to	map	out	a	strategy	for	victory.	Barkley	was	expected	
Senator Barclay Speaking at Mammoth Cave Dedication. Congressman 
Earle C. Clements is seated at far left, and Kentucky Governor Simeon 
Willis is seated at the right of the podium.  Sept 8, 1946
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to	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 campaign.	 Barkley	
commented	on	this:
Well	of	course,	it	was	expected	that	I’d	take	
an	active	part	in	this	presidential	campaign,	as	
a	matter	of	fact,	more	active	than	the	President	
himself,	because	he	had	to	remain	 in	Wash-
ington	a	portion	of	the	time.		He	couldn’t	just	
start	out	and	spend	six	weeks	on	the	stump	
without	going	back	to	Washington,	but	I	could	
because	Congress	was	not	in	session,	and	I	had	
no	other	task	except	to	help	win	the	election.	
(Shalett,	1953)
Some	 doubted	 that	 Barkley	 could	 maintain	 the	
vigorous	campaign	schedule	necessary	because	of	his	
J o h n  g h a e l i a na l B e n  W .  B a r k l e y :  h a r r y  s .  t r u m a n ’ s 
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age.		He	would	prove	them	wrong.		Early	in	his	political	
career	he	had	earned	the	nickname	“Iron	Man”	because	
of	the	energy	he	had	when	he	campaigned.		This	vital-
ity	was	seen	when	he	ran	for	county	attorney,	county	
judge,	Congress,	and	Senate.		It	would	not	abandon	him	
while	he	campaigned	for	the	vice	presidency.		He	was	
especially	invigorated	for	the	1948	race.		Barkley,	who	
had	recently	lost	his	first	wife,	“found	the	campaign	a	
tonic.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	119)	 	To	deal	with	his	grief,	
Barkley	campaigned	harder	than	he	had	before.	
President Roosevelt signing the Social Security Act, Congressman Robert 
L. Doughten, Senator Alben Barkley, Senator Robert F. Wagner, Frances 
C. Perkins (Secretary of Labor), Senator Pat Harrision, Congressman 
David J. Lewis, among others.   August 14,1935  
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Figure 2b. Devil’s Looking Glass. Photo by Charles Swedlund, Richard 
Young pictured.
	In	order	to	meet	his	obligations	to	the	campaign,	
he	suggested	a	“prop-stop,”	meaning	he	could	travel	the	
country	by	plane.	Eventually	the	Democratic	National	
Committee	agreed	to	his	request	and	chartered	a	DC-3	
plane	named	 “The	Bluegrass.”	 (Davis,	 1979,	 p.	 264)	
Barkley’s	extensive	use	of	the	plane	for	campaigning	was	
the	first	time	this	had	ever	been	done	in	the	United	States.	
The	plane	included	a	bunk,	and	Barkley	was	accompa-
nied	by	two-speech	writers,	a	secretary,	two	journalists,	
two	pilots,	a	campaign	manager,	and	two	stewardesses.	
(ibid.)		Barkley	would	make	the	most	of	these	resources	
and	by	the	end	of	the	campaign	he	had	covered	more	
ground	than	any	of	the	other	candidates.	
Harold	Gullan	believes	 the	 two	men	determined	
that	Truman	would,	“make	major	addresses	in	cities	in	
such	states	as	New	York	and	Pennsylvania	that	he	was	
unlikely	 to	carry	hoping	his	message	would	 resonate	
widely.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	116)		While	Truman	mainly	
focused	on	large	states	and	on	national	issues,	“Barkley	
was	able	to	tailor	his	appeals	to	more	localized	issues.	He	
focused	his	attention	not	only	on	the	South	and	later	on	
the	Midwest,	but	also	on	states	with	key	Senate	races.”	
(Gullan,	1998,	p.	117)		Barkley	was	admired	within	all	
segments	of	the	Democratic	Party.	With	the	party	split	
three	ways,	this	was	extremely	important.	His	popular-
ity	with	 the	 Southern	wing	of	 the	party	was	needed	
to	 ensure	 that	 on	Election	Day	 the	Dixiecrats	would	
not	 expand	 from	 their	 “four-state	 base”	of	Alabama,	
Clark Griffith, Vice President Alben Barkley, and Connie Mack at the opening of Baseball Season.  Year 1949
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Mississippi,	 Louisiana,	 and	 South	Carolina.	 (Gullan,	
1998,	p.	124)		Truman	was	charged	with	limiting	the	
impact	of	Wallace	and	the	Progressive	Party.	(Gullan,	
1998,	p.125)
After	a	brief	trip	to	Rome	for	a	meeting	of	the	In-
terparliamentary	Union,	the	Senator	returned	to	begin	
his	campaign.	In	New	Orleans	on	October	16,	he	used	
many	of	the	themes	that	he	would	use	throughout	the	
South.		Barkley	declared,	“It	cannot	be	denied	that	a	vote	
for	any	other	ticket	than	the	regular	Democratic	Party	
ticket	is	in	its	effect	a	vote	for	the	Republican	Party.”		In	
the	same	speech,	he	argued	that	the	Republican	Party,	
“has	not	understood	the	South	or	its	problems,	and	has	
permitted	and	even	encouraged	the	exploitation	of	the	
South	by	those	same	plutocratic	interests	which	have	
always	dominated	the	Republican	Party.”		In	his	address,	
Barkley	did	not	refer	to	Thurmond	except	by	inference.	
(New York Times,	1948a)		The	crux	of	Barkley’s	argu-
ment	was	that	by	voting	for	a	third	party,	the	South	lost	
and	the	Republicans	won.		Republicans,	according	to	
Barkley,	had	never	cared	for	or	understood	the	South	
and	they	never	would.	
In	his	appeals	to	Southern	voters,	the	Senator	was	
always	sure	to	mention	the	historic	relationship	between	
the	South	and	his	party.	In	Asheville,	NC,	on	September	
27,	he	stated,	“It	would	be	a	tragic	thing	if	the	partner-
ship	between	the	Democratic	Party	and	the	South	were	
to	be	destroyed.”		Barkley	mentioned	the	contribution	
of	famous	Southern	Democrats	like	Thomas	Jefferson	
in	his	address.	While	campaigning	in	Nashville,	TN,	on	
October	18,	he	offered	the	example	of,	“Woodrow	Wilson	
who	gave	to	the	Democratic	Party	the	world	vision	from	
which	it	has	not	departed.”		In	these	addresses	Barkley	
showed	why	he	had	been	nicknamed	“Mr.	Democrat”	
with	 praises	 of	 the	 party,	 declaring	 in	 his	Nashville	
speech,	“The	Democratic	Party	is	the	oldest,	most	ex-
perienced,	and	most	representative	political	party	in	the	
nation.”		With	his	oratory,	Barkley	built	an	image	of	the	
South	and	the	Democratic	Party	united	in	their	goals	and	
in	their	history.	He	portrayed	the	candidacy	of	Thurmond	
as	an	assault	on	an	almost	holy	union.	
Barkley’s	meetings	with	local	politicians	during	his	
southern	campaign	swing	were	an	important	part	of	his	
efforts.	According	to	Gullan,	“Barkley’s	most	important	
exercises	in	persuasion	were	conducted	off	the	podium,	
in	private	 talks	with	Southern	officeholders,	many	of	
whom	were	old	acquaintances.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	125)	
This	was	a	logical	role	for	Barkley	to	fulfill.		While	he	
had	 supported	 civil	 rights	 legislation	 throughout	 his	
career,	 he	 believed	 strongly	 in	 compromise,	 making	
him	more	acceptable	to	Southerners.		Also,	his	work	as	
Minority	Leader	in	1946	to	allow	Senator	Theodore	Bilbo	
of	Mississippi	to	be	seated,	despite	charges	of	corrup-
tion,	had	been	appreciated.		In	large	part,	his	popularity	
with	Southerners	stemmed	from	his	personality.		Dean	
Acheson,	Truman’s	Secretary	of	State,	wrote	of	Barkley	
that	 he	 “was	not	 only	 the	most	 popular	man	 in	 the	
Senate,	but	easily	the	most	popular	in	Washington.	He	
was	warm	because	he	had	a	deeply	affectionate	nature	
and	really	liked	people.”	(Acheson,	1961,	p.140)		People	
responded	to	Barkley’s	warm	personality,	allowing	him	
to	connect	with	voters,	gain	important	positions,	pass	
legislation,	and	work	out	compromises.	In	his	conversa-
tions	with	Southern	politicians,	Barkley	would	remind	
them	that	a,	“Republican	victory	might	cost	them	their	
influence,	if	not	their	jobs.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	125)		Bar-
kley	was	mostly	successful	in	his	talks	with	Southern	
leadership.	
Due	to	the	importance	of	keeping	the	majority	of	the	
South	Democratic,	Barkley’s	speeches	were	methodically	
crafted.	Gullan	writes	that	Barkley’s	Southern	speeches,	
“were	carefully	prepared,	tailored	to	his	specific	audi-
ence,	and	devoid	of	the	humor	he	usually	employed.”	
(Gullan,	1998,	p.	124)		This	was	the	only	leg	of	the	cam-
paign	where	Barkley	relied	heavily	on	his	speechwrit-
ers.		Once	Barkley	moved	to	other	parts	of	the	country,	
his	natural	and	humorous	speaking	style	returned.		In	
Dover,	DE,	on	September	22,	Barkley	made	a	rare	men-
tion	of	Dewey’s	name	when	 it	began	 to	 rain,	ending	
his	speech	early,	he	jokingly	said,	“I	don’t	want	you	to	
get	wet.	In	fact	I	don’t	even	want	you	to	get	dewey.”		
Local	 issues	were	mentioned	 in	his	speeches.	 	While	
Vice President Barkley addressing the dedication of 
Ashland, the Henry Clay Estate, in Lexington, Ken-
tucky.  Year 1950
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Figure 4c. Standing Rock. Photo and digital filtration 
by Charles Swedlund, 
in	Greeley,	CO,	on	October	5,	he	focused	on	electrical	
issues,	public	water	usage,	and	land	development.		In	
Greeley,	the	Senator	stated,	“of	course,	you	know	that	in	
the	Republican	dialect	socialization	means	anything	the	
government	does	on	behalf	of	a	lot	of	people,	while	the	
American	Way	means	anything	the	government	does	for	
an	influential	few.”		Barkley’s	humor	made	his	attacks	
on	the	Republicans	less	mean	and	more	effective.	
An	 unexpected	 issue	 of	 the	 campaign	 was	 the	
farmer’s	need	for	storage	space	for	surplus	crops	like	
wheat	and	corn.	1948	had	proven	be	 to	a	good	year	
for	agriculture.	In	previous	years	the	Commodity	Credit	
Corporation	(CCC)	was	allowed	to	lease	extra	facilities	
so	farmers	could	store	their	surplus.	In	June,	Congress	
revised	the	CCC’s	charter	so	that	the	organization	could	
only	rent	office	space.	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	150)		This	change	
meant	 that	 farmers	had	 to	 sell	 their	 surplus	quickly,	
which	 in	 turn	drove	down	prices.	Historian	Zachary	
Karabell	explains:	
Though	the	Republican	platform	alleged	a	
commitment	to	price	supports,	by	stripping	the	
CCC	of	its	role	in	renting	or	constructing	stor-
age	buildings,	Congress	essentially	drove	down	
agricultural	prices.	At	the	same	time,	the	cost	
of	manufactured	goods	was	rising.	With	less	
income	from	their	farms,	farmers	were	being	
pushed	to	the	brink.	(Karabell,	2000,	p.	210)
The	 change	was	 little	 noticed	when	 it	was	first	
enacted,	but	toward	the	end	of	the	campaign	it	would	
prove	to	be	a	deciding	factor	in	the	election.	
The	Democrats	were	the	first	to	realize	the	potential	
potency	 of	 this	 issue.	Gullan	 asserts,	 “By	 September	
Clifford	was	fully	alert	to	this	almost	providential	new	
issue.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	151)		Truman	would	first	use	the	
issue	for	partisan	advantage	during	a	campaign	stop	in	
Dexter,	IA.		Declaring	that	the	GOP	stands	for	“gluttons	
of	 privilege,”	he	 accused	Republicans	 in	Congress	 of	
working	to	destroy	the	small	farmer.	(Lawrence,	1948d,	
p.	1)		After	attacking	the	Republicans	for	changing	the	
CCC	he	loudly	proclaimed:
There	is	only	one	way	to	stop	the	forces	
of	reaction.	Get	every	vote	out	on	election	day	
and	make	it	count.	I’m	not	asking	you	just	to	
vote	for	me.	Vote	for	yourselves,	vote	for	your	
farms,	vote	for	the	standard	of	living	that	you	
have	won	under	a	Democratic	Administration,	
get	out	there	on	election	day,	and	vote	for	your	
future.	(ibid.)
The	people	who	heard	the	president	were,	in	the	
words	of	one	observer,	“an	interested	crowd,	but	not	a	
very	demonstrative	one.”	(ibid.)	 	Truman’s	speech	at	
Dexter	was	a	good	example	of	the	president’s	“weakness	
of	political	positioning	and	rhetorical	stridency.”	(Gullan,	
1998,	p.	119)		The	president’s	penchant	for	overusing	
drama	 in	his	 speeches	 often	weakened	 their	 impact.	
Despite	the	lack	of	an	enthusiastic	response	in	Dexter,	
“a	seed	had	been	planted.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	152)	
The	seed	“would	be	cultivated	by	Alben	Barkley,	
making	his	 impact	 on	 the	 second	 critical	 region	 that	
determined	the	outcome	of	the	election.”	(ibid.)		Barkley	
used	the	farm	issue	to	the	ticket’s	advantage	throughout	
his	tour	of	the	Midwest	and	far	West.		The	issue	was	
mentioned	by	the	candidate	in	Iowa,	Minnesota,	Kansas,	
Idaho,	Montana,	and	many	other	places.	He	accused	
the	Republicans	 of	 having	no	 farm	policy,	 declaring	
in	Kansas	 that	 the	Republican	policy	 “would	neither	
protect	the	gains	of	the	last	sixteen	years	nor	provide	
adequate	growth	in	the	future.”	(New York Times,	1948b)	
In	Mankato,	MN,	on	October	3,	Barkley	mentioned	the	
CCC	issue	specifically	and	asked,	“If	 the	Republicans	
are	elected	in	November,	what	can	we	expect	them	to	
do	next	year?”		Barkley	was	later	criticized	for	the	tac-
tics	he	used	when	courting	the	farm	vote.		But	despite	
these	criticisms	“his	campaign	methods…	had	certainly	
worked.”	(Gullan,	1998,	p.155)	
The	 farm	vote	had	 traditionally	gone	Republican	
until	Roosevelt,	but	in	1940	and	1944,	it	started	to	vote	
Republican	overwhelmingly	again.	Barkley	had	always	
thought	that	victory	was	possible,	but	he	had	not	been	
sure	of	it	until	he	reached	the	Midwest.	He	later	told	an	
interviewer,	“And	when	I	got	out	into	the	.	.	.	what	they	
Visit to Sicily and Rome, American Cemetery at Anzio, Italy, together 
with Senator Lucas, and Congressman Reed.  Standing by an American 
coffin. Year 1947
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called	the	Corn	Belt	out	in	the	Middle	West,	the	great	
agricultural	states,	I	began	to	feel	that	the	tide	was	in	
our	direction.”	(Shalett,	1953)		By	using	the	frustration	
of	 farmers	 to	 the	Democrats’	advantage,	Truman	and	
Barkley	had	managed	to	capture	a	significant	portion	
of	the	Republican	base.	In	1948,	the	Republicans’	mis-
takes	on	agriculture	policy	hurt	them	significantly	with	
a	normally	reliable	part	of	their	base.	
Throughout	the	race,	Barkley	attacked	the	record	of	
the	Republicans	and	defended	the	accomplishments	of	
Democrats.	According	to	Barkley,	in	1929,	Hoover	had	
brought	the	country	to	the	brink	of	ruin,	but	the	efforts	
of	Roosevelt	and	the	New	Deal	saved	the	nation.	Remarks	
like	this	helped	to	give	Democrats	a	sense	of	pride	in	
belonging	 to	 their	 party.	 Barkley’s	 speeches	 instilled	
a	sense	of	confidence	 in	 the	party’s	base	about	 their	
chances	in	November.	Speaking	before	a	labor	union,	
a	major	part	of	the	Democratic	base,	in	Wilkes-Barre,	
PA,	 on	 September	 19,	 he	 declared	 that	 Republicans	
were	scared	because,	“They	know	they	deserve	to	be	
the	minority	party	because	 they	 represent	a	minority	
of	the	people,	whose	spokesman	are	the	Grundys,	and	
the	Pews,	and	the	special	interests.”		The	laborers	loved	
the	 Senator’s	 remarks	 and	 interrupted	with	 applause	
several	times.	
Barkley	managed	to	convey	a	sense	of	hope	to	the	
Democratic	Party	that	they	could	win	despite	the	elites	
of	political	punditry	predicting	their	efforts	were	useless.	
Take	for	example	a	widely	circulated	issue	of	U.S. News 
and World Report	 (October	 15,	 1948)	 that	 appeared	
weeks	 before	 the	 election	 with	 the	 cover	 declaring,	
“‘Popular	vote	close	electoral	vote	heavy	for	Dewey’	says	
George	Gallop.”		Largely	because	of	Barkley’s	efforts,	
Democrats	did	not	give	up.	Davis	writes,	“Probably	the	
greatest	contribution	of	the	Democratic	vice-presidential	
nominee	was	his	ability	to	inspire	party	workers	with	
his	own	optimistic	outlook.”	(Davis,	1979,	p.	266)		Re-
publican	overconfidence	about	their	certainty	of	victory	
caused	laziness	in	their	presidential	ticket,	their	political	
strategist,	and	their	party	workers.
Truman	and	Barkley	continued	their	vigorous	cam-
paign	until	the	eve	of	Election	Day	when	the	two	men	
returned	to	their	hometowns.		Truman	gave	one	last	radio	
broadcast	after	Barkley	introduced	him.		Speaking	from	
Paducah,	KY,	on	November	1,	in	his	introduction	Barkley	
recalled	Roosevelt’s	death	and	Truman’s	ascension	to	the	
presidency.		Barkley	stated,	“Now	that	his	[FDR’s]	great	
personality	had	merged	with	that	of	other	great	men	in	
the	eternity	of	the	ages,	all	eyes	and	hearts	turned	to	the	
man	who	under	our	Constitution	grasps	the	pilot’s	wheel	
of	our	ship	of	state.”		Truman,	according	to	Barkley,	had	
been	a	magnificent	 leader.	 	He	declared	 that	Truman	
“brought	strength	to	our	economy,	expansion	and	per-
manence	to	our	influence	and	hope	to	hopeless	men	and	
women	throughout	the	world.”		After	his	introduction,	
Barkley	placed	his	hands	in	his	pockets	and	went	into	
his	bedroom,	closing	the	door.		He	would	not	reappear	
for	several	hours.	(Gullan,	1998,	p.	174)
VI. Conclusion
On	Election	Day,	Americans	headed	to	the	polls	con-
vinced	 they	would	have	a	new	president.	They	were	
wrong.	 	The	popular	vote	was	close	with	24,104,836	
going	to	the	Truman-	Barkley	ticket	and	the	Dewey-War-
ren	ticket	earning	21,969,500	votes.	(Davis,	1979,	p.	268)	
In	the	Electoral	College	the	Democrats	had	won	303	to	
189.	(ibid.)		Despite	the	predictions	of	the	press,	polls,	
and	people,	Truman	and	Barkley	emerged	from	the	hard	
fought	campaign	as	victors.	Barkley	later	bragged	to	his	
friend,	U.S.	Supreme	Court	Justice	Hugo	L.	Black,	on	
November	19,	that	their	victory	“confounded	the	met-
ropolitan	press,	the	poll	takers,	the	radio	commentators,	
and	 the	general	 assembly	of	pessimists	who	 thought	
this	 election	was	 over	 before	 the	Convention	met	 in	
Philadelphia.”	(Barkley	Papers,	Box	65,	Folder	12)		To	
another	acquaintance,	Earle	Clements,	Then	Governor	
of	Kentucky,	he	wrote	the	Democrats	won	because	“the	
people	did	their	own	thinking	and	their	own	victory.”	
(Clements	Papers,	Box	229,	Folder	3)
Barkley’s	efforts	were	a	major	contribution	to	the	
Democratic	 victory.	With	his	 plane,	 “The	Bluegrass”	
Barkley	 campaigned	 in	36	of	 the	48	 states,	 gave	250	
Barkley watches and posses as the sculptor makes the 
final cuts to his bust.  Year 1956
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speeches,	and	 traveled	150,000	miles.	 (Shalett,	1953)	
Both	Barkley	and	Truman	worked	hard	for	their	victory.	
Once	they	were	nominated,	they	met	quickly	to	map	
out	 their	 election	 strategy.	During	 the	 campaign,	 the	
communication	between	the	two	camps	remained	good,	
which	allowed	them	to	take	advantage	of	unexpected	
issues	 like	 the	CCC.	 	Both	men	 thought	 victory	was	
possible,	not	inevitable.	This	attitude	made	them	work	
hard	because	it	gave	them	the	hope	that	they	could	win,	
but	it	did	not	deceive	them	into	thinking	their	task	was	
easy.		The	Republican	ticket	had	acted	as	if	they	had	
already	won,	causing	Barkley	to	comment	that	Dewey	
acted	like	“the	election	was	a	formality;	it	would	be	just	
a	confirmation	of	what	the	people	had	already	made	up	
their	mind	to	do.”	(Shalett,	1953)		The	American	people	
responded	positively	to	the	energy	of	the	president	and	
his	vice	presidential	nominee.	
Barkley	would	serve	as	vice	president	under	Tru-
man	 for	 four	 years.	He	briefly	 attempted	 to	 gain	his	
party’s	nomination	in	1952,	but	his	efforts	stalled	when	
organized	labor	deemed	him	too	old.		The	“Iron	Man”	
refused	to	retire	from	the	political	scene	and	challenged	
John	Sherman	Cooper	the	incumbent	Republican	Sena-
tor	from	Kentucky.	(Hatfield,	1997,	p.	428)		In	1954,	he	
was	victorious.	(ibid.)		Two	years	later	he	was	invited	to	
give	a	speech	at	Washington	and	Lee	University;	there	
he	would	give	his	final	speech	before	his	sudden	death.	
(New York Times,	1956)	
Since	his	death,	Barkley	has	been	largely	forgotten.	
This	is	unfortunate	because	Barkley	was	a	major	force	
behind	many	of	the	political	decisions	made	in	the	first	
half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 that	 continue	 to	 shape	
American	political	discourse	to	this	day.	His	efforts	dur-
ing	the	1948	campaign	have	been	largely	overshadowed	
by	President	Truman.	Barkley	contained	the	Dixiecrats	
to	their	four	states	and	kept	the	rest	of	the	South	in	the	
Democratic	column.		His	work	in	the	Midwest	 led	to	
the	Democrats	capturing	states	that	had	gone	for	Dewey	
only	four	years	earlier	such	as	Iowa	and	Minnesota.		He	
convinced	 the	party’s	base	not	 to	give	up	despite	all	
polls	and	pundits	declaring	their	efforts	worthless.	These	
factors	contributed	greatly	to	Truman’s	victory	in	1948,	
but	have	received	little	attention	from	historians.		Even	
though	Barkley	has	passed	from	the	memory	of	most	
Americans,	his	legacy	still	lives	on.	
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